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THE INTEGRATION OF THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN TEACHING STRUCTURAL
ISSUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Daan Braveman*
William Banks**
1

For fifteen years and four editions, our casebook has differed from the mainstream canon2 in two respects. First, we give
relatively greater emphasis to the structure of government issues
of federalism and separation of powers. Constitutional law
casebooks and courses typically include an examination of judicial review, distribution of power among federal branches and
between the federal and the state governments, and individual
rights. The second of these themes, however, is often shortchanged in favor of the study of the first and third. Structural issues have played, and continue to play, an important role in constitutional law and in society generally. Moreover, concerns
about distribution of governmental power may influence individual rights determinations. 3
To facilitate this allocation of the subject areas, we divided
our basic constitutional law offering into two required courses,
each three credits. Constitutional Law I begins with an examination of judicial review but then focuses exclusively on federalism
and separation of powers. The separate Constitutional Law II
course, taught in the Fall semester of the second year, examines
individual rights issues.

• Dean and Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.
•• Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor, Syracuse University College of
Law.
1. Daan Braveman, William C. Banks, and Rodney A. Smolla, Constitutional Law:
Structure and Rights in Our Federal System (4th ed. 2000).
2. We use the term to refer to the teaching canon, the material used to educate law
students. See J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
Harv. L. Rev. %3,970 (1998).
3. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
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We also depart from the traditional approach to constitutional law by attempting to integrate constitutional theory and
doctrine with practical problems. During the past decade, considerable attention has focused on methods of integrating theory
4
and practice into the study of law. While much of this literature
focused on clinical legal education, some suggested the values of
greater integration in traditional classrooms as well.5 From the
beginning of our collaboration, we agreed that students understand constitutional law theory better after they see its application, and that the practical implications are more fully appreciated when the development of constitutional law theory is
learned. We prepared a set of problems for nearly every section
of each chapter, and we use the problems to emphasize the practical component of constitutional law in most class sessions. The
problems provide opportunities to escape the "pigeonholing" 6
effect of legal education, allowing students to see relationships
among topics covered in their other courses. In some instances,
the practical problems also allow the use of interdisciplinary material. Finally, the problems expose students to professional
lawyering skills and issues of professionalism.
As our book and teaching evolved, we devoted considerably
more time and book space (in relative terms) to separation of
powers and federalism. We resisted reprinting most secondary
source materials, and we presented only bare bones notes and
questions following full case edits. We use our book, supplementary materials, and the classroom to integrate course topics
whenever possible, to illustrate the role of social science disciplines in solving constitutional law problems, to show how state
constitutional law relates to and complements federal law, and to
bring some current constitutional law issues to the students' attention. The following discussion uses three examples to illustrate our use of practical problems to teach the structural issues.

4. See, e.g., Hugh Brayne, Nigel Duncan, and Richard Grimes, Clinical Legal
Education: Active Learning in Your LAw School (1998); J.P. Ogilvy, Leah Wortham, and
Lisa Lerman, Learning From Practice (1998); Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The
Integration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 Hastings L.J. 717 (1992); Phyllis G?ldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 15 Minn.
L. Rev. 1599 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Richard Boldt and Marc Feldman, The Faces of LAw in Theory and
Practice: Doctrine, Rhetoric, and Social Context, 43 Hastings L.J. 1111 (1992).
6. The "pigeonholing" practice attempts to place issues in single boxes and, in so
doing, impedes development of an understanding of the complexities of the subject. As
Laurence Tribe observed, pigeonholing "endangers the pigeon." Laurence Tribe,
American Constitutional LAw 943 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988).
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TEACHING FEDERALISM THROUGH THE 11TH
AMENDMENT
We begin the federalism section with a consideration of the
reasons for a federalist structure and a historical overview. Specifically, our book includes historical material about the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates. It then presents textual material that briefly traces the federalism theme in
the pre-Civil War period, in the period from the Civil War to the
New Deal, and in the modern period.
Like most casebooks, we examine federalism limits on the
elected branches and the states. In this chapter, we first study
the scope of federal power and then explore congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce. The final section includes the dormant commerce clause cases as a vehicle for
studying constitutional limits on the states' power to regulate
commerce. For the most part, this chapter is typical of most
other books and includes much of the "canon."
The problem in this chapter places the students in the role
of legislators who are considering whether Congress has the
power to enact a bill that requires all public and private employers of 15 or more employees to provide a certain level of health
insurance coverage. The problem reappears as we progress
through the material. When the students first consider the
problem after reading McCulloch they have difficulty finding a
source of power, even with the Court's conclusions about the
Necessary and Proper Clause. We then begin the commerce
clause material and discuss the problem after reading Gibbons,7
Knight, 8 and Hammer. 9 When they study the post-New Deal
cases/0 they begin to see the potential for relying on the commerce clause to enact the bill. Finally, we examine the more recent cases 11 and consider their impact on congressional power.
The problem enables students to understand the development of
the commerce clause theory and doctrine over time. It also provides an opportunity to discuss underlying federalism values and
whether congressional regulation in this area threatens those
7. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
8. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
9. Hammer v. Dagenhan, 247 U.S. 25 (1918).
10. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964).
11. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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values. Finally, the students must examine the legislator's duty
to consider constitutional issues and the differences between the
legislative and judicial processes. In that regard, the problem is
a bridge to the Public Law Processes course (a required first year
course focusing on lawmaking by legislative and administrative
bodies). We ask students to build the kind of legislative record
that might be needed to support the legislation. We compare the
process for developing that record with the judicial process. We
also discuss the legislator's ability to balance political considerations with the duty to uphold the constitution.
Our most significant departure from the canon is the chapter on "Federalism Limits on Federal Courts." Here, we include
material that is taught more commonly in Federal Courts
courses. We cover the Eleventh Amendment/2 abstention, 13
remedies, 14 and Supreme Court review. 15 We have found that
this material provides a richer opportunity than the commerce
clause to examine the constitutional structuring of state-federal
relations, the role of the courts in weighing federalism concerns,
and the underlying federalism values.
Once again, we use a problem throughout the chapter as a
vehicle for focusing the study. Last year, the problem was a
variation of a case pending in Rochester, New York, which
challenges the state's method of allocating funds to public
schools. We review the complaint and the factual allegations
supporting the claim that New York State is denying a minimally
adequate education to children in the Rochester school district.
The plaintiffs allege that the state is violating the state and federal constitutions as well as Title VI. They are seeking injunctive
relief directing the State to develop a plan to remedy the effects
of the past disparities and to ensure that Rochester school children will be provided an adequate education in the future.
At the outset (before we discuss any of the material), we
consider where the parties might prefer to litigate the case, state
or federal court. It is an opportunity to review material that is
usually pigeonholed in the Civil Procedure course. For example,
12 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 511 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden
v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
13. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
14. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1
(1987).
15. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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we discuss subject matter jurisdiction, including issues relating to
federal question jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction, and supplemental jurisdiction. We also examine other factors that affect
the forum selection decision. Such an examination leads to a
discussion of the relative willingness and competence of state
and federal courts to consider the issues raised in the complaint.
We then study the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on the
power of the federal courts. As in the commerce clause area, we
use the problem to illustrate the development of the doctrine
over time, the underlying federalism issues, and the practical application. Beginning with the language of the Amendment, we
consider whether plaintiffs in the Rochester case would be
barred from federal court. Next, we discuss the effect of Hans16
on the forum selection decision and try to reconcile that case
11
with the Amendment's language. Young and Edelman18 allow
the students to explore the possibilities of avoiding the impact of
Hans, depending on the relief requested. Seminole/ 9 reveals further limits on Young that might have an impact on the ability of
the Rochester plaintiffs to bring their case in the federal court.
The problem also provides an opportunity to discuss waiver
of the Eleventh Amendment immunity. After Seminole, we examine whether Title VI abrogates the state's immunity and
whether Congress has the power to do so. This leads to a consideration of the relative power under Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment and why the federalism considerations might
be different. Finally, when we next teach the material we will
examine the impact of Alden and whether it prevents the suit
against the state in any court. Alden is an excellent vehicle for
exploring the federalism values at stake and whether the exercise of jurisdiction in such cases disserves the purposes of our
federal structure.
Following the study of the Eleventh Amendment, we consider the application of the abstention doctrine if the case were
brought in federal court. Could the state successfully argue under Pullman or Thibodaux that the federal court should abstain
while the plaintiffs litigate their state constitutional claim in state
court? Similarly, could the state invoke Younger-style abstention, particularly after Pennzoil?
16.
17.
18.
19.

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Ex Pane Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Eldelman v. Jordm!, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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We end the study of this chapter by asking the students to
decide where they would bring the Rochester case. This gives us
a chance to summarize the doctrine and the theory of federalism
and again address some practical considerations. For example,
do the plaintiffs want to bring the case in federal court, taking
many years and spending large resources to litigate the jurisdictional and abstention issues (and not reaching the merits)?
Would they recommend that the plaintiffs bring two cases, one
in state court and the other in federal? In considering this later
possibility we have an opportunity to discuss whether plaintiffs
can afford two lawsuits and to incorporate Civil Procedure material on claim and issue preclusion. We also discuss the question
of who chooses the forum, the client or the lawyer, and the difficulties in adequately counseling a client on the issues that might
govern the decision. At the end of the discussion, we inform
them that the case was actually filed in state court and hope they
have an appreciation and understanding of the theoretical and
practical considerations that might have justified the forum selection.
TEACHING SEPARATION OF POWERS THROUGH
ARTICLE III
Without a doubt, the constitutional law scholarship canon
includes Article III and the justiciability doctrines. The casebooks generally present materials on standing, political question,
and mootness/ripeness, at a minimum. Yet Article III has traditionally been at the fringes of the pedagogic canon, based on the
belief that the students can learn the ideas in a Federal Courts
course, or that time is short and the subject is abstract and not at
the core of basic constitutional law. Too few students take the
Federal Courts course (at least at our school) to justify omitting
Article III in the basic Constitutional Law course. Article III is
demonstrably at the core of constitutional law today,20 and we
believe that many of its abstract ideas can be made more concrete if they are presented in a way that demonstrates the interrelationship of justiciability and decisions on the merits. The
20. Apart from significant developments in the law of citizen and legislator standing
in the 1990s, and the important political question decision in Nixon v. United States, 506
U.S. 224 (1993), consider the buzz in constitutional law circles con~~ng the justiciability of challenges to President Clinton's impeachment and the contmumg questwn of the
reviewability of constitutional challenges to deportations pursuant to the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Naturalization Act. See generally Reno v. Arab-American
Anti-Discrimination Committee, 119 S. 0. 936 (1999).
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traditional teaching canon focuses largely on the Supreme Court,
thereby contributing to the abstractness of the lessons. To reduce the abstract quality, we assign and discuss supplementary
materials that illustrate how separation of powers law is made by
the political branches in working through actual disputes over
policy.21 By combining the teaching of justiciability and separation of powers through a war powers exercise, we find that students learn a great deal about the theory and practice of separation of powers. The abstract becomes practical, and the practical
lessons reinforce the theory.
Our book's section on justiciability follows a section on the
foreign relations and war powers, part of a larger chapter on
separation of powers. At the end of the war powers material, a
problem supplies portions of the complaint in the district court
from Del/urns v. Bush,22 the most prominent of the judicial challenges to the Gulf War. The problem asks the students to take
into account the foreign relations and war powers, including the
War Powers Resolution, in framing an answer to the complaint
on behalf of President Bush. In class, discussion ranges from the
text of Articles I and II, to Y oungstown23 and the approaches to
separation of powers found in the Youngstown Court's several
opinions, to The Prize Cases, 24 to the War Powers Resolution. 25
Mter some discussion of the merits arguments, it is appropriate
to ask whether a district court judge would really enjoin the Gulf
War. The transition to justiciability is thus made.
We offer some narrative on Article III and on the separation of powers theory embedded in the justiciability doctrines.
Instead of the usual Supreme Court fare on political question,
standing, and ripeness, we present the principal Gulf War
cases-Del/urns and Ange v. Bush. 26 This permits us to return to
the war powers problem and to revisit the discussion on framing
an answer and then arguing a motion to dismiss on behalf of the
President. The decision in Del/urns may be viewed as "answering" the problem, but it is possible simply to present the questions on appeal of Judge Greene's decision.
21. We assign and discuss frequently separation of powers and federalism materials
presented in Louis Fisher and Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law
(West, 2d ed. 1996). We find the notion that three branches make separation of powers
law a useful antidote to the court-centeredness of the casebook.
22. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
23. 343 u.s. 579 (1952).
24. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
25. 50 u.s.c. §§ 1541-48 (1994).
26. 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).
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The factual background of Dellums and Ange begins with
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990. President Bush
then ordered the deployment of a force to protect against further
Iraqi advances-Operation Desert Shield. By early November,
approximately 230,000 United States armed forces were deployed to Saudi Arabia and to the Persian Gulf. Then, on November 8, the President announced a significant increase in the
military deployment in the Persian Gulf for the express purpose
of providing the United States with an offensive force capable of
forcing Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. On November 19, Representative Ronald Dellums and 53 other Members of Congress
sought a court order enjoining the President from offensive military operations against Iraq unless he obtained an authorization
from Congress pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the
Constitution.Z7
On December 13, Judge Greene denied the injunction and
ruled that the lawsuit was not ripe for judicial resolution, for two
reasons. First, a majority of Congress had not expressed a view. 28
Second, the executive branch had not demonstrated a sufficient
commitment to the option of initiating war without congressional authorization. 29 He also rejected the Government's arguments that the lawsuit should be dismissed for lack of standing of
the congressional plaintiffs, or in exercise of the court's remedial
discretion. 30 Finally, Judge Greene ruled that the political question doctrine did not bar the court from deciding the constitutional merits question in an otherwise appropriate case: "[I]n
principle, an injunction may issue at the request of Members of
Congress to prevent the conduct of a war which is about to be
31
carried on without congressional authorization.... "
Factually, Ange differs from Dellums only in that plaintiff
Michael Ray Ange was a serviceman deployed to the Persian
Gulf in Operation Desert Shield. His claims for relief also mirror those in Dellums, except that Ange claimed in addition that
the Operation Desert Shield deployment violated the War Powers Resolution. In Ange, Judge Lamberth ruled that the war
powers questions presented were nonjusticiable political questions.32 Judge Lamberth also ruled that Sergeant Ange's lawsuit
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32

Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1143-44.
ld. at 1149-51.
ld. at 1151-52.
ld. at 1147-49.
ld. at 1149.
Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 511-15 (D.D.C. 1990).
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was not ripe, based on the "speculative" nature of the "threat"
that the President would bypass Congress and launch an offensive war. 33 According to Judge Lamberth, his refusal to exercise
jurisdiction simply leaves Congress with the option of declaring
war, preventing the President from doing so through exercise of
34
the appropriations power, or impeaching President Bush.
The political question doctrine's application to the problem
may be addressed by asking why a federal judge would decide a
dispute between members of Congress and the President. In
Dellums, Judge Greene answered the Government's political
questions argument by noting that leaving it to a "semantic decision by the Executive" to determine whether an offensive military operation constitutes a "war" that the Congress must
authorize "would evade the plain language of the Constitution. "35 While other cases might present a closer factual question
and provide cause for deferring to the political branches to decide whether an operation is a "war," the magnitude of forces
poised for attack made this question easy to answer. Although
there is ample authority for the proposition that it is for the
President to conduct the nation's foreign relations, 36 the courts
routinely decide foreign relations cases. 37 The differing approaches of Judges Greene and Lamberth to the political question doctrine also allow consideration of the theoretical components of the textual commitment and prudential bases for the
doctrine, and for application of the theory to the facts of the
Gulf War problem. Judge Greene noted that courts can and do
answer the question of which political branch decides to take the
nation to war,38 while Judge Lamberth found that the same decision was textually committed "not to one of the political
branches, but to both."39 Judge Lamberth did not say why the
Declaration and Commander in Chief clauses could not be interpreted independently. Judge Greene chose not to invoke the
prudential justifications for finding a political question, based on
the stark magnitude of the forces aligned in the Gulf. 40 Judge
33. ld. at 515-17.
34. ld. at 514.
35. Del/urns, 752 F. Supp. at 1145.
36. See generally, Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (1972).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Cuniss-Wright Expon Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
38. Del/urns, 752 F. Supp. at 1146. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635,
668 (1863); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611,613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
39. Ange, 752 F. Supp. at 514.
40. Del/urns, 752 F.Supp. at 1146.
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Lamberth, on the other hand, relied on the lack of standards and
lack of expertise rationales from Baker v. Carr. 41
The fact that the Supreme Court rarely invokes the political
question doctrine is itself a subject for discussion, and the long
odds against Supreme Court review may be tied to discussion of
what strategy to take in representing Dellums or the President in
the problem. Our note treatment of Nixon v. U.S. 42 also illustrates that the Court may muddy the theory of political questions
by finding textual commitment and prudential bars to reviewing
whether the "sole power" impeachment language bars the Senate from delegating to a committee the function of gathering
evidence and hearing testimony.
Next, the standing to sue issues may be introduced by asking why the federal courts insist on anything more than a willingness to litigate and ability to pay the filing fees in order to
bring a lawsuit. The separation of powers content of Dellums
and Ange on standing to sue flows easily from discussion of the
problem. In general, it is easy to see that relaxation of standing
rules expands judicial power. But is such a tendency realistically
to be feared in the war powers context? Are standing rules the
most appropriate device for limiting judicial power? Does the
law of standing serve interests that are not met by the political
question doctrine?
The discussions about legislators as plaintiffs might begin by
asking students to identify the capacities in which a legislator
may sue. Suits on behalf of constituents are a classic form of
third-party standing and generally present only a generalized
grievance. Suits to vindicate a personal or institutional interest
in legislative prerogatives are more typical. After the Court's
decision in Raines v. Byr~ in 1997, such suits are also now quite
difficult to maintain. Before Raines, Judge Greene's decision in
Dellums ~plied the vote nullification standard from Kennedy v.
Sampson in finding that the plaintiffs were injured in fact because of the threat that their right to vote for or against a declaration of war would be lost. Judge Greene pointed out that this
right must be confirmed by the court before the President acts,
not afterward, in order to have any practical significance. Thus,
there was a sufficient threatened injury to satisfy the standing
3

41.
42.
43.
44.

Ange, 752 F. Supp. at 512; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962).
506 u.s. 224 (1993).
521 u.s. 811 (1997).
511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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requirements. One practical lesson is that the judge's decision
will depend on the factual setting.
Once Raines is assigned, the analysis and the result may
change. Raines is not a war powers case, but its strong disavowal
of legislator standing in general and its requirement that legislators' votes be completely nullified by the President's action erect
a significant obstacle to legislator standing. This barrier is made
even more formidable by the Court's reliance on the fact that
other legislative actions could still, in theory, be taken to provide
a legislative remedy. After Raines, the Dellums group look
more like dis~runtled losers in the political process than success4
ful plaintiffs.
For private citizen plaintiff Ange, Judge Lamberth found
standing "to seek enforcement" of the War Powers Resolution,
based on a determination that the Resolution permits a private
right of action. Whether or not Judge Lamberth correctly applied the standard for private causes of action, he did not find
that Ange had been injured in fact. 46 Student problem solvers
should see that Ange's case presents a close call. Was his injury
"actual or imminent," or "concrete and particularized?"47 The
students should also see how, in the context of the problem,
standing blends into the ripeness inquiry.
Judge Greene determined that Dellums was not ripe for decision because Congress, or a majority of Congress, had not been
"heard from" and because the President had not committed
himself to initiating war unilaterally. Thus, for Judge Greene,
the constitutional impasse described by Justice Powell in Goldwater v. Carter48 did not exist. The problem forces students to
consider the ripeness aspect of the theory of justiciability and to
assess the separation of powers reasons for and against the impasse standard. In addition, the problem may be used to return
to the merits and to critique Judge Greene's analysis. It does not
necessarily follow that because a majority is required to declare
war, only a majority may seek a court order enjoining the President from initiating war. Logically, because the Constitution re45. This result was confirmed in the Kosovo litigation. See generally Campbell v.
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. C. T. 1999).
46. After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), Judge Lamberth's
analysis of standing would not be sustained.
47. We also note for students that gadfly litigant Walter Pietsch's Gulf War suit
against the President was dismissed on both citizen and taxpayer standing grounds.
Pietsch v. Bush, 755 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
48. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Powell, 1., concurring).
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quires that Congress affirmatively declare war, a smaller number
of Members (as few as fifty-one Senators, for example) could
prevent the President from initiating war. Thus, that smaller
number should be permitted to persuade a judge to enjoin the
President. Put differently, the fact that a majority of Congress
may have an incorrect opinion concerning the legality of the
President going it alone against Iraq should not deny the court
an opportunity to say whether the President must ask for
authorization. The better ripeness argument on the facts of the
problem and Dellums is that the executive branch had not yet
committed itself to offensive war.
Students will see that the impasse standard is prudential in
nature, derived from separation of powers concerns. Logically,
then, it is possible for the judges in this dispute to have found
standing but not a ripe controversy, although practically the two
inquiries blend together. Especially in light of Judge Lamberth's
opinion that Ange would likely never be able to present a justiciable controversy, it is fair to ask whether the ripeness and
standing doctrines are merely convenient tools for avoiding difficult cases.
Several objectives are served by combining the war powers
and justiciability sections in our separation of powers unit in this
way. First, we are able to develop fully the Article III law in the
basic constitutional law course. We devote at least one class
week to justiciability, and we spend ample time discussing both
theory and practice issues. Instead of highly complex and abstract concepts of legitimacy and textual commitment (political
question doctrine), and the theoretical separation of merits from
standing and ripeness, students learn how separation of powers
purposes are furthered through selective enforcement of "do
nothing" rules by judges in real legal disputes.
Second, continuation of the Gulf War problem allows students to see the relationship of the underlying merits to Article
III, and to appreciate the importance of inquiries about justiciability in a concrete setting. Third, the problem and cases
force the students to understand theory. For example,
parsing
49
the Wechsler/Bickel debate about political questions, thinking
through the Marbury 50 judicial review doctrine's application, and
49. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-9 (1959); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40,75 (1961).
50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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applying the Baker v. Carr factors 51 are essential ingredients in
developing an answer to a motion to dismiss in Dellums. It has
normally been our experience after teaching the separation of
powers unit that the section on justiciability contributed more to
the students' understanding of the separation of powers in constitutional law than any of the more traditional separation topics
within the canon.
CONCLUSION
As we considered changes for the fourth edition of our
casebook, we decided that, other than updates, our objectives
are being well served by the book as it is. Our book works well
at teaching basic doctrine and theory and examines the integration of theory, doctrine, and practice. We agree with others,
however, that greater attention should be given to constitutional
law and practice in legislatures, executive offices, agencies, and
local government institutions. As the canon evolves, we strive to
complement our course with materials and discussion that will
explore these topics as well as important developments in state
constitutional law.

51.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1 %2).

